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Capturing beneﬁts from water entitlement




While there is potential for substantial beneﬁts from water entitlement trade,
external eﬀects such as salinity may mean that traders cannot capture these beneﬁts.
This paper demonstrates that by creating a trading house as a single seller of water
entitlements, with trade proﬁts distributed to buyers, it is possible to achieve an
allocation of entitlements which gives a social outcome higher than that possible
from atomistic competition for entitlements. Such an outcome may be comparable
to an optimally set uniform charge for water entitlements, but the trading house
mechanism has the advantage that it makes use of trade to generate information on
the optimal level of charging in the presence of salinity.
1. Background
The potential net beneﬁts of trade in water entitlements have been estimated
to be around 5 per cent of the total gross margin per year to irrigators in the
Murray–Darling Basin (Hall et al. 1994). With diversions from regulated
rivers in the basin capped since the mid 1990s and increasing demand for
water for new developments, trade in temporary entitlements is rapidly
becoming the principal means of reallocating scarce water resources. In the
Goulburn–Murray region, for example, only 43 temporary trades in water
entitlements occurred in 1989–1990, representing 22 gigalitres of water. By
1999–2000, this had risen to around 3600 temporary trades, or about 204
gigalitres (Goulburn Murray Water 2000).
Bilateral trades, handled directly by irrigators, comprise the bulkof
temporary water trade. However, formal markets or water exchanges have
emerged in those areas where most of Australia’s irrigation water is used
and traded (New South Wales Department of Land 1999; Chandler 2000).
For example, the Southern Riverina Water Exchange was established in
1997 to service irrigators in the Murray district, and the Northern Victoria
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Goulburn–Murray and Sunraysia regions.
1 A statewide water exchange is
planned to be operational in Victoria by the start of the 2002–2003
irrigation season. These water exchanges bring buyers and sellers together
on a regular basis, implement state and regional restrictions on trade and
provide information on traded prices.
In order for trade to lead to a socially eﬃcient allocation of water, water
entitlements need to be deﬁned such that the full costs and beneﬁts of all
water use are assigned to a water entitlement holder. That is, every unit of
water, at each point in the storage, delivery and hydrological system where
it has some value, needs to be under entitlement. However, the common
pool nature of water within the storage systems and delivery channels, and
the diﬀuse and uncertain nature of impacts associated with water use,
means that water entitlements are unlikely to ever be deﬁned in terms of
full costs and beneﬁts of water use (Bell and Beare 2000). Use of water for
irrigation, for example, can have external impacts on both the volume and
salinity of water available to downstream users and the riverine environ-
ment more generally (Murray–Darling Basin Commission 1999a). Trade in
imperfectly deﬁned entitlements that ignores these externalities can poten-
tially result in an allocation of water that increases the external salinity
costs of water use by more than the gain in productive use of the water
entitlement, thereby costing society more than it gains from trade. Water
markets are now at a point where it is important to assess the property
rights, structure and institutional frameworks that may be necessary to
ensure that trade results in an allocation of water resources that improves
social welfare.
1.1 Allocative eﬃciency of trade
In simplistic terms, trade in water entitlements will result in water shifting
toward those uses in which it yields the highest marginal return, net of
transfer costs. However, the allocative eﬃciency of trade will hinge on the
extent to which markets are able to account for a number of factors that
aﬀect the value of water used. These factors include the timing of water use,
system evaporative losses, and return ﬂows which aﬀect both the quantity
and quality of water available to other users.
Beare and Bell (1998) demonstrate that trade is unlikely to lead to an
eﬃcient allocation of water entitlements when the value of water use varies
1 Around 72 gigalitres of water was traded via the Southern Riverina Water Exchange in the
2000–2001 season (Murray Irrigation 2001). The Northern Victoria Water Exchange handled
60 gigalitres (31 per cent) of the region’s temporary water trade in 2000–2001 (Goulburn
Murray Water 2001).
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the capacity of the delivery system. For irrigators that use water for relatively
low valued pasture or cropping activities, the traded price of this entitlement
may be well below the marginal returns associated with expanding higher
valued activities that require additional water during the peakirrigation
season. A water entitlement purchased from an individual who uses that
water in the oﬀ-season may not convey to the purchaser a guaranteed access
right in the peakseason. Beare and Bell also note that the failure to link
water entitlements to the use of distribution infrastructure at a particular
time of the year can mean that water trade results in a stranding of irrigation
assets.
2 In recognition of this potential problem, there has been a general
reluctance to allow trade between regions that do not share delivery
infrastructure.
3
Further inhibiting an eﬃcient allocation of water entitlements through
trade is the existence of substantial evaporative losses. There may be
large evaporative losses in transporting water through open channels to
farms near the end of an irrigation system compared with delivery to
farms close to water storages. There may also be signiﬁcant quantities of
water used but not accurately measured. If diﬀerences in delivery costs
between farms are not reﬂected by diﬀerences in delivery charges, then
some irrigators will pay a delivery charge in excess of the marginal cost
of delivery to them, while others pay less (Haﬁ et al. 2001). The resulting
allocation of water is unlikely to be eﬃcient, and entitlement trade that
does not take these diﬀerences in delivery costs into account may not
improve it.
Not explicitly including rights to return ﬂows within the scope of water
entitlements may also reduce the eﬃciency with which a market can allocate
water. A return ﬂow is the water associated with an irrigation diversion that
returns to the hydrological system as surface runoﬀ from ﬂood irrigation,
irrigation drainage, channel seepage or ground water discharge from
irrigation areas. Irrigators presently hold an implicit right to return ﬂows
in that they can trade water entitlements without consideration of
downstream externalities (Beare and Heaney 2001). To the extent that these
downstream impacts are signiﬁcant, the allocation of water entitlements will
be ineﬃcient.
2 The stranding of assets is an extreme situation that may arise, for example, if transfers of
entitlements out of an irrigation area leaves an irrigation authority with large ﬁxed infra-
structure costs but no customers.
3 For example, irrigation schemes on the Macquarie River in NSW prohibit out-of-scheme
permanent trade and in Victorian, water authorities can refuse out of area permanent transfers
if annual net transfers exceed two per cent of water rights in the sourced area.
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Return ﬂows may be associated with positive or negative externalities to
other water users and the environment. The principal positive externality
of return ﬂows is an increase in the volume of river ﬂows downstream.
A common negative externality associated with return ﬂows is the problem
of irrigation-induced salinity. Increased return ﬂows from irrigation areas
with relatively high groundwater salt concentrations, or reduced return
ﬂows from areas with relatively low groundwater salinity, may raise the
salinity of streams lower in the system. The extent to which return ﬂows
aﬀect stream salinity depends on several factors, including groundwater
recharge rates and the salinity of aquifers beneath irrigation areas. In the
Murray–Darling Basin, both groundwater and stream salinity levels tend
to increase downriver, with groundwater salinity approaching the salt
concentration of seawater in low lying areas of South Australia (MDBC
1999b).
Beare and Heaney (2001) describe the impact that water trade may have on
river salinity. Trade that moves water from an irrigation area with relatively
low groundwater recharge rates and low groundwater salinity to a down-
stream region with high recharge rates and groundwater salinity can produce
a series of impacts on stream salinity. Immediately downstream of the seller,
the transfer may increase stream ﬂows and reduce river salt concentration.
However, as groundwater recharge rates are higher in the downstream area,
surface runoﬀ will be lower, reducing the volume of return ﬂows available
downstream of the buyer. Further, as groundwater salinity is higher
downstream, salt concentrations will be increased as more salt is transported
to the river system.
Increased salinity reduces the productive capacity of agricultural resources
and can adversely aﬀect infrastructure such as roads and the quality of
environmental assets such as wetlands. River salinity in parts of the Murray–
Darling Basin is already at concentrations at which yield reductions can
occur for irrigated crops. The problem is expected to become more
widespread throughout the basin over the next 100 years (MDBC 1999b).
At a state-wide level, the incentive for upstream states in the Murray–
Darling Basin to regulate salinity has been promoted by the introduction of
the Salinity and Drainage Strategy (MDBC 1999a). States earn credits by
funding the construction of salt interception schemes or other methods of
reducing stream salinity, and lose credits by allowing actions which increase
salinity. In Victoria, areas with high salinity impact have been identiﬁed and
water trade into these areas is prohibited. In addition, a levy has been
introduced on water transferred into the Sunraysia district in the Victorian
Mallee (Young et al. 2000).
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transactions costs associated with establishing property rights that fully
internalise the eﬀects of return ﬂows on downstream users are likely to be
prohibitive. Beare and Heaney (2001) suggest regulation to alter the price at
which water entitlements trade, in order to reﬂect the costs or beneﬁts
associated with downstream changes in river salinity as a result of trade. An
alternative approach that may require less information would be to modify
the market structure so that external costs will be at least partly internalised,
without continuous monitoring and intervention. Such an approach is
consistent with intergovernmental agreement on the National Action Plan on
Salinity and Water Quality (AFFA 2001) and is the focus of this article.
The remainder of the paper explores the scope for water entitlement
markets to improve social welfare, through a reallocation of entitlements,
when there are signiﬁcant external salinity costs associated with water use.
Given the often diﬀuse spatial nature of salinity, the eﬀectiveness of markets
will depend on how much information those trading have on the potential
salinity outcomes of trade. Such information may be apparent if entitlements
are deﬁned spatially, or alternatively, may become evident to traders as the
market operates over time. The ability of markets to generate information on
the salinity outcomes of trade is discussed and a simulation model is
developed to explore the eﬀectiveness of alternative market structures in
improving social welfare.
2. Optimal and second-best trade outcomes
2.1 Spatially diﬀerentiated entitlements
The construction of institutional arrangements in which agents face the full
beneﬁts and costs associated with their resource use decisions is a notable
economic objective of resource policy. Where the location of resource users is
important, such that the use of a shared resource by one agent aﬀects the
value of the resource to other agents, a policy mechanism which diﬀerentiates
among resource users according to their location is essential if an eﬃcient
allocation of the resource is to be achieved.
Trade in water entitlements is a means by which water users can adjust
their level of use between periods within a market framework. Entitlements
that diﬀerentiate between agents according to the external impacts of water
use are essential if the costs and beneﬁts of water use are to be fully
internalised (Montgomery 1972). Trade in spatially diﬀerentiated water
entitlements will yield an optimal water allocation, equivalent to setting a
Pigouvian or site-speciﬁc charge, under the following conditions. First,
entitlements must be deﬁned at each site aﬀected by water use. Second, agents
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if an agent’s use of water impacts on several downstream sites, then the agent
must hold an entitlement with the right to impact on each of these
downstream sites. Third, the market for entitlements must be competitive at
each site: that is, perfect and complete information; buyers and sellers unable
to inﬂuence market outcomes individually or collusively; free entry and exit
to the market with new entrants trading on the same terms as existing traders;
and fully divisible entitlements.
In a market for water entitlements, this would require information on the
value of an additional unit of water to each agent in the market and the
costs and beneﬁts to other agents and to environmental assets associated
with any impacts of water use, such as salinity damage. With seasonal and
economic variations in production conditions, this information would be
required at each point in time that a trade occurs. The transactions costs of
establishing such a spatially diﬀerentiated scheme are likely to be prohib-
itively high (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1987; Hanley et al. 1997). Hence, an
entitlement scheme based on spatially undiﬀerentiated entitlements is
potentially a more practical instrument for improving water entitlement
allocation.
2.2 Spatially undiﬀerentiated entitlements
A spatially undiﬀerentiated entitlement scheme is equivalent, in terms of the
aggregate outcome to society, to the implementation of an optimally-set
uniform charge on water entitlements. As this is a second best policy
instrument, it is important to ascertain the eﬀectiveness of such a scheme and
to attempt to establish market conditions that will facilitate an outcome for
water entitlement allocation as close as possible to optimal.
A potential beneﬁt of a tradable entitlement scheme is that trade may
generate information regarding a socially preferred level of use, as well as a
more eﬃcient distribution of entitlements. This is a potentially attractive
option to policy makers in that they may only need to establish a set of
trading arrangements to achieve a better resource management outcome.
Individuals can retain their current level of entitlements, bear the information
and transactions costs and realise any beneﬁts of trade.
A competitive market with a large number of buyers and sellers has
long been accepted in economic theory to be an appropriate market
structure to generate the information necessary for trade to result in an
eﬃcient allocation. This presumes that buyers and sellers perceive and
incur the full costs and beneﬁts of trade. The presence of external costs
and beneﬁts can prevent a competitive market from achieving a socially
eﬃcient outcome.
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networks is that the value of an entitlement will depend not just on price but
on the locations of other agents who buy and sell water. Purchasing water
entitlements from an upstream producer along a river may have a
substantially diﬀerent outcome for salinity than purchasing the same
quantity of water entitlements from a producer downstream. The produc-
tivity of the water associated with entitlements purchased may be increased,
for example, by purchasing from a region that has relatively high recharge
rates and groundwater salinity. In such an instance, an individual’s marginal
return from a transaction may not be equal to the market price as the
marginal return will vary depending on who is buying or selling. Green
(1977) establishes that competitive market equilibrium may not exist where
there is quantity dependence and agents are only able to observe prices.
That is, if in order to calculate their optimal actions, agents need to observe
not only market prices but also the salinity outcome from trade, then
there may be no achievable market equilibrium. The ability of markets to
generate such information can diﬀer signiﬁcantly between alternative market
structures.
3. Market structure and the outcome of trade
In order to ascertain the eﬀectiveness of alternative water entitlement trading
mechanisms in internalising externalities such as salinity, water use decisions
and impacts must be considered separately for each trading agent. This
essentially requires consideration of each trader as a self-advancing agent. An
agent is unable to take into account the full external beneﬁts and costs of his
water use decisions, but recognises that water use decisions of other unknown
and self-advancing agents impact on the productivity of his own water use. In
this way, the externalities inherent in the networkof water use can be
modelled explicitly. Multi-agent based approaches to the modelling of
economic problems have been an active area of research in recent years (e.g.,
Boutilier et al. 1997; Hernandez Iglesias and Lopez Paredes 1999).
Consider, for example, a number of identical agents that access water
sequentially along a river and use of the water in production raises the salt
concentration of water available to agents further downstream. This example
is described algebraically in the appendix.
Agents may be either individual irrigators, aggregations of water users
within the same region, or simply sites that use water and incur salinity costs
associated with water use by other agents. The impact of water use on
salinity, and of salinity on the productivity of water use downstream is
assumed, for simplicity, to be instantaneous. Agents are assumed to be price
takers in the market for their production.
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entitlement each year. An entitlement is assumed to deﬁne the quantity of
water that can be used on the agent’s site. Agents are assumed to be able to
purchase water to completely fulﬁl the entitlement by entering a separate
water market.
Each agent develops a trading strategy that maximises its own individual
net revenue from production and trade, and is only able to observe market
price and the impact of salinity at its own location. The quantity of water
entitlements traded and the price at which they exchange will be determined
largely by the structure of the market in which trade occurs and the
information that is available to market participants.
3.1 Atomistic competition example
Suppose that the water entitlement market operates as an atomistic
competition – that is, it is composed of a number of small agents who can
either buy or sell water entitlements, depending on the expected return from
water use compared with trade. Trade occurs through a sealed bid double
auction in which entitlements are distributed to the highest bidding agents
ﬁrst until the water market is cleared at a single trade price (Wilson 1985;
Satterthwaite and Williams 1989).
4 Harris and Raviv (1981) note that in
uniform price auctions bidders face uncertainty with respect to both
acceptance and price. However, Smith (1982) reports that knowledge of
valuations and costs of all agents is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for rapid
convergence of allocations and prices in a double auction.
Agents are assumed to start with no information on the value of an
entitlement, but learn through a series of market trials, to formulate a bid
that will maximise their own expected net revenue, given a range of strategies
that other agents may adopt (this process is detailed in Appendix I). The
actual trade outcome is that which results from the market resolution of the
set of agent’s ﬁnal bids.
5
4 The uniform price double auction approach is currently used for temporary trades
undertaken through the Northern Victoria Water Exchange (New South Wales Department of
Land and Water Conservation 1999). The clearing price is set to maximise the volume of water
sold, given volumes available, prices which sellers wish to receive and prices which buyers wish
to pay. The exchange operates weekly during the irrigation season.
5 Traders could be expected to have some information on the value of a water entitlement in
their production activities, given that irrigation has been undertaken for many decades in
those areas of Australia where most trade in water entitlements occurs. Any information that
agents utilise in formulating bids may reduce the number of market trials necessary for an
agent to derive a bid that maximises their expected net revenue.
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that are captured by traders, with maximum beneﬁts achievable through the
imposition of a site-speciﬁc water entitlement charge. These beneﬁts are in
the form of an increase in the value of water used in production by
downstream agents. Agents upstream may receive higher revenue from
water entitlement sales, but at a society level this may be oﬀset by the
higher cost of entitlement purchases by those downstream. It is important
to note that a lackof information will mean that the mark et in water
entitlements is not perfectly competitive and so the outcome of trade is
unlikely to be optimal. Asymmetry of information may even provide some
agents with market power. For example, agents at the top of a river system
know that any trade they undertake will not impact on the productivity of
their own water use because trade will necessarily occur with an agent
downstream. However, agents part way down a river system may not know
if a transaction will shift water use upstream or downstream of their own
location.
In such an example, trade in water entitlements will not result in an
eﬃcient allocation of entitlements. Bell and Beare (2002) demonstrate this
for alternative spatial conﬁgurations of traders in the context of site speciﬁc
pollution emission permits. Using the river system example, if an agent at
the bottom of the networkpurchases water from one at the top of the
networkthis may convey a beneﬁt to those agents in the middle of the
network, as a reduction in return ﬂows from the top agent may have
salinity beneﬁts to those in the middle as well as the purchaser at the
bottom. As the bottom agent does not capture the full beneﬁts of trade
with the top agent, the price that the bottom agent would be willing to pay
will not be suﬃcient as to result in an optimal distribution of water. In the
absence of cooperation between agents, the jointness creates a public
externality in trade.
Of particular interest here is how close to the optimal outcome (associated
with a site speciﬁc entitlement charge) the outcome of atomistic competition
may be, and how robust this result is to the diﬀuseness of the salinity
problem, as represented by the number of participants in the entitlement
market.
From ﬁgure 1, it can be seen that as the number of market participants
was increased (or equivalently, with an increase in the number of sites that
incur salinity costs associated with water use), the overall eﬀectiveness of a
simple tradable entitlement scheme declined substantially. That the double
auction gives a close to optimal result with few agents is perhaps not
surprising. Smith (1982) reports experiments in which allocations and prices
converge to the competitive equilibrium outcome with six to eight bidders
and two sellers. The more agents there are, the more diﬃcult it is for each
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been found to arise in other multi-unit auction experiments, but is
exacerbated here by the uncertainty created by the presence of production
externalities.
6 For example, increased stream salinisation as a result of
higher water use by one agent may impact on a group of agents or sites
downstream. This increases the extent of the externality and makes it more
diﬃcult for those agents downstream to determine a trading strategy that
reduces the salinity costs that they incur. No single agent is able to identify
and capture the full beneﬁts of trade between diﬀerent locations. Hence, in
the absence of cooperation between aﬀected agents, the price each agent is
willing to pay for an entitlement is lower than it would be if that agent were
able to capture the full beneﬁts of reduced salinity.
The expected traded price of entitlements drops sharply as the number of
market participants rises, reﬂecting the inability of individual agents to
identify and capture the beneﬁts of reduced salinity through entitlement
purchases. If the impact of water use on salinity is lagged in time, it is even
more diﬃcult for agents to identify the beneﬁts of a reduction in salinity.
Figure 1 Impact of market size on atomistic competition
6 Smith (1987) reports that multi-unit auction markets appear to be less eﬀective than single
unit auction markets in disciplining (with failure experiences) those strategies which depart
from the dominant strategy.
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entitlements, the price discovery process must eventually provide some
understanding of the economic impacts of the physical externality, which in
turn allows an improvement in the level and distribution of resource access or
use. However, provision of such information is not characteristic of a
competitive market in which rents associated with reducing the net cost of an
externality are competed away. To achieve a more eﬃcient distribution of
entitlements, the trade process must generate suﬃcient information to enable
agents to identify and capture these rents. As the number of agents in the
market increases, the need for an alternative market structure to facilitate this
process becomes imperative.
3.2 Centralised trading house example
One option to enable traders to capture the rent associated with a
reduction in the cost of externalities is to artiﬁcially reduce the number of
traders in the market. This can be achieved by reducing the market to a
single seller through the establishment of a central trading house. Under
such a scheme, all agents would surrender their entitlements to a central
trading house that would simply seekto maximise its returns from the sale of
entitlements, and distribute these returns backto agents.
7 The shares of
agents in the trading house are critical to the general acceptability of the
scheme by agents and the eﬃciency of the trade outcome. One option would
be for agents to have equal shares in the trading house. An alternative is for
agents to hold shares in proportion to the entitlements surrendered (which
may, in turn, be based on use of water pre-trade).
Non-atomistic market structures enable price experimentation in a market
and may generate information on the salinity beneﬁts and costs of a
redistribution in water entitlements. This is analogous to the way in which a
monopolist can gain and exploit information on the elasticity of demand
through, for example, price experiments. However, here the use of this
information in setting the price at which entitlements trade may enable an
improvement in the distribution of entitlements and the level of salinity.
8 The
idea that a monopoly is able to generate and use more information than a
7 The surrender of all entitlements to a trading house, regardless of whether or not agents
require more or less water than their entitlement, may not be a preferred approach for some
existing entitlement holders but may mean that new developments ﬁnd it easier to obtain
water. If, on the other hand, only those intending to undertake temporary trade surrendered
their entitlements to the trading house, then the beneﬁts available from a reduction in the
externality are likely to be signiﬁcantly reduced.
8 It may also be necessary to ensure that the trading house is not able misuse this infor-
mation in order to generate proﬁts in some other sector of the economy.
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incentive to generate information for technological advancement is at least as
great under a monopoly as in a competitive industry. Mason (2000) showed
that, based on a dynamic market for a durable consumer good, when




production and resulting externalities below) those associated with atomistic
competitioninwhichtraderscompeteawayanyavailablerentsassociatedwith
a reduction in salinity (see Carlton and Perloﬀ 1990 for a discussion of
monopoly and competition in markets with externalities). To the extent that
wateruseincreasesthecostofsalinity,andsalinityreducesthenetbeneﬁtsfrom
water use, then a reduction in water use will provide beneﬁts to society.
In attempting to maximise its revenue from entitlement sales, the trading
house has available to it the minimum price at which it will sell an entitlement
as its decision variable. At higher prices, less water may be used by all – but
most importantly, by those upstream whose water use has the largest external
costs. A redistribution of entitlements from upstream to downstream agents
reduces the salinity cost that upstream agents impose on those downstream.
The productivity of water in production does not change for those upstream,
but increases for those downstream. Reﬂecting this, those downstream would
be willing to pay a higher price for an entitlement. Provided that each agent’s
bids strictly increase with their valuation of entitlements (and all are equally
riskaverse), the auction outcome will result in entitlements going to bidders
with the highest valuations (Vickrey 1961; Kagel and Levin 2001). In this
way, a trading house is able to facilitate a redistribution of entitlements from
upstream agents to downstream agents.
Informationrequiredbythetradinghousetoachievesuchanoutcomeisthe
initialdistributionofentitlements,agents’bidsforthepurchaseofentitlements
and the revenue from entitlement sales. Agents, in the process of acquiring
water entitlements, will supply the ﬁrst two items of information. Information
on the net revenue outcome of trade is simply an outcome of trade, evident to
the trading house as the single entitlement seller. This information is more
readily determined than information on diﬀuse salinity beneﬁts and costs that
is necessary for an eﬃcient outcome under atomistic competition.
In the stylised example, with a central trading house as a single seller of
entitlements, and proﬁt from trade distributed to agents in proportion to
entitlements surrendered, up to 90 per cent of the total potential beneﬁts (that
is, the potential increase in the value of water used in production) are
captured by agents. This is signiﬁcantly higher than the proportion of
beneﬁts captured through atomistic competition trade in entitlements
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atomistic competition is accentuated as the number of water buyers, or the
number of salinity aﬀected sites, increases.
In the example, water use is lower overall when there is a trading house
than under atomistic competition, indicating that there are beneﬁts to retiring
entitlements from use in the system (particularly from agents near the top of
the system). Individual agents trading atomistically are unable to perceive the
beneﬁts of such action. Consequently, their oﬀer prices for entitlements do
not reﬂect these potential gains, nor do they realise the full beneﬁt of retiring
entitlements. Consistent with this, the traded price of entitlements is higher
when there is a trading house than under atomistic competition.
Despite retiring entitlements from use in the system, there are suﬃcient
funds generated by trade for the trading house outcome to be a Pareto
improvement over both the no-trade situation and the atomistic competition
outcome for more than three agents. That is, under the trading house
structure, agents at the top of the river networkwill have a larger proportion
of their net revenue sourced from water entitlement sales, while those at the
bottom of the networkwill have a larger proportion of net revenue sourced
from production.
The outcome with the trading house is comparable to that achievable
under a uniform charge scheme (ﬁgure 2). However, the information and
monitoring required to achieve an optimal uniform charge may make it a less
favourable option than market-based options. The principal limitation of
Figure 2 Beneﬁts captured from a reallocation of water. Tradable entitlements with
atomistic competition; j Tradable entitlements with trading house; h Uniform charge
(beneﬁts to agents); Uniform charge (revenue to collector)
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an optimal uniform charge (either each period, or in an iterative manner with
convergence toward an optimal level), the policy maker needs to know the
agent speciﬁc production information and details of external costs of each
agent at each point in time.
The impact of a uniform charge on income distribution may be quite
diﬀerent to the outcome under a tradable entitlement scheme. Unless charge
revenue is returned to agents in ﬁxed and predetermined proportions, the
income distribution impacts associated with a charge may make it a less
favourable option for agents than a tradable entitlements scheme in which
agents receive a proportion of the returns made by a central seller of
entitlements (ﬁgure 2).
4. Concluding remarks
While there is potential for substantial beneﬁts from trade in water
entitlements, the existence of external eﬀects such as salinity may mean that
much of these beneﬁts cannot be realised by those trading. The value of a
traded water entitlement will depend not just on price, but on the salinity
outcome associated with trade. Where the external costs and beneﬁts
associated with water use are signiﬁcant, there may be a role for resource
managersandpolicymakerstocreateinstitutionalarrangementsthatfacilitate
an internalising of salinity costs. State and Federal governments in Australia
have committed to greater use of market-based solutions to salinity and water
allocation problems. This paper has explored the scope for water entitlement
marketstoimprovesocialwelfarethroughareallocationofentitlements,when
there exist signiﬁcant external salinity costs associated with water use.
The diﬀuse nature of salinity and the spatially undiﬀerentiated deﬁnition of
entitlements will mean that information on salinity impacts is unlikely to be
discernible through a water entitlement market that operates with a number
of buyers and sellers. This inability of individual traders to identify and fully
capture the beneﬁts of reduced salinity (and costs of increased salinity) may
mean that trade does not actually increase the total net beneﬁts of aﬀected
water users. This is particularly a problem as the number of atomistic traders
in the market increases. One option that is proposed in this paper to increase
the beneﬁts captured from water entitlement trade is to establish a centralised
trading house.
With a central trading house as a single seller of entitlements, and with
proﬁt from trade distributed to agents in proportion to entitlements
surrendered, it was demonstrated that a trading house structure enables price
experimentation and thereby can generate information on the salinity beneﬁts
and costs of a redistribution in water entitlements. With a trading house, an
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higher than that possible from atomistic competition for entitlements.
The formula by which trading house proﬁts are distributed to water traders
is crucial to the acceptability of such a structure in the market. In the stylised
example presented in this paper, proﬁts were distributed to agents in
proportion to entitlements surrendered. In such a case, trade alone was found
to be insuﬃcient to result in a Pareto improvement over either the no-trade
situation or the atomistic competition outcome. However, trade with a
trading house did generate suﬃcient funds to ensure that with compensation
to those agents contributing the most to salinity reduction, this option would
be the preferred market structure.
One of the principal limitations of the trading house scheme as applied
here is the need for a series of market trials in order to enable agents to
learn a bidding strategy that maximizes their net revenue. If traders have
some information on the value of a water entitlement in their production
activities, then use of this information in formulating bids may reduce the
time it takes agents to locate a bidding strategy that maximises their net
revenue. However, it is important to consider the objective of the exercise –
that of increasing the beneﬁts derived from water entitlement trade by
internalising the salinity costs of water use – and alternative approaches
that policy makers may adopt to achieve this goal. With less than perfect
information, a single trial with the trading house structure is analogous to a
single attempt by a policy maker at setting the optimal level of a uniform
charge on entitlements. However, the trading house has the advantages that
it may be preferable in terms of income distribution consequences, and it
may have lower monitoring and information costs.
Ultimately, the extent to which a trading house can improve social welfare
by a reallocation of water entitlements, compared with the allocation that
would result from atomistic competition, will vary between regions. In
regions where water users neither contribute to salinity levels nor incur
salinity costs as a signiﬁcant part of production costs, the introduction of
measures which raise water prices and reduce water use in production may
generate costs which exceed the beneﬁts of any salinity reduction. However,
in those regions where water use contributes signiﬁcantly to increased
salinity levels and the costs of salinity are relatively high, the introduction of
a trading house may provide a substantial increase in beneﬁts to water
traders.
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Appendix
The basic form of the model is that used in Bell and Beare (2002). While the
choice of functional form is ultimately arbitrary, the forms selected allow the
exploration of a range of production possibilities and external impacts. A
trade emulation algorithm was embedded in a larger agent-based simulation,
implemented in EXTEND (Imagine That 2000) using a genetic algorithm
(Holland 1975). The simulation model can be used to examine a range of
economic instruments for resource management with an arbitrary spatial
networkof n agents. Each agent is represented by an independent proﬁt
maximising algorithm. Production dependencies are represented by the
networkconnections. Externalities that arise through an agent’s production
process are passed sequentially along these connections.
The production function for an individual agent i is represented by a
generalised quadratic function:
fit ¼ lit ai1xit þ ai2yit   ai3xityit   ai4x2
it   ai5y2
it
  
lit;ail > 0 8 i;t; l ¼ 1t o5 ð1Þ
where fit is agent i’s output at time t, xit and yit are inputs to production at
time t, and lit and ail are production function coeﬃcients.
An externality Eit incurred by agent i is assumed to arise through the use of





where Ji is the set of agents above agent i in the resource use networkand dj is
the proportion of agent j’s usage of input x which is transferred as damage to
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have a non-linear impact on agent productivity such that:
lit ¼ max 0;li0   ciE2
it
  
for 0 < ci < 1 ð3Þ
Individual agents act independently to choose x, y, the quantity and reserve
price of entitlements oﬀered for sale and the quantity and bid price of
entitlements to purchase, to maximise expected proﬁt p each period from
production and entitlement trade. That is:
pit ¼ pproduction þ pentitlements ð4Þ
for
pproduction ¼ pfit   cxit   dyit ð5Þ
where p is the market price of output, and c and d are constant unit input
costs. For an initial allocation of entitlements of wi to agent i, if there is no
central trader of entitlements then pentitlements is given by:
pentitlements ¼ qt zit   vit ðÞ for xitOwi   zit þ vit ð6Þ
where q is the traded entitlement price, vit is the quantity of entitlements
purchased by agent i and zit is the quantity of entitlements from agent i’s
initial allocation which are sold. If there is a central seller of entitlements
which is maximising revenue from entitlement sales, then agent i’s proﬁt from
entitlement trade is given by:








The ﬁrst term of (7) is the cost of entitlement purchases and the second is
agent i’s share of revenue from entitlement sales by the central trader. Note
that if all available entitlements are sold, revenue from entitlement sales
received by agents is the same when there is a central trading house as when
there is no central trading house. The values of parameters used to calibrate
equations (1)–(7) are detailed in table 1. With this set of parameter values, the
marginal cost function for resource damage is convex and the production
function is concave. The model results were found to be robust to alternative
parameterisations that preserve the concavity of the production function and
the non-concavity of the marginal cost function. Sensitivity analysis results
are available from the authors on request.
To emulate trade in water entitlements, a sealed bid auction frameworkwas
utilised in which entitlements are distributed to the highest bidding producers
ﬁrst until the entitlement market is cleared. Individual producers are assumed
to be self-advancing, with each attempting to ﬁnd their own optimal
combination of inputs and entitlements. The agents are linked through
market outcomes and through the production externality (equations 2 and 3).
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Each agent engaged in trade has a set of potential trading strategies. Under
atomistic competition, an individual agent’s trading strategy consists of four
non-negative elements: a quantity oﬀered for sale, an associated reserve price
on the quantity oﬀered, a quantity bid for additional entitlements and a bid
price. Agents are assumed to start with no information on the value of an
entitlement, but learn through a series of market trials, to formulate a bid
that will maximise their own expected net revenue. In each trial, agents
submit their bid to the market. To evaluate a set of trading strategies, trades
are executed from the highest to successively lower bid prices until the market
is cleared. The market price is the marginal bid (the lowest bid price that is
accepted). Given the entitlement outcome, agents calculate their net revenue
from optimal use of entitlements in production, taking into account the
impact of others on their own productivity, and use this information to revise
their bid to the market in the following trial in an attempt to increase their net
revenue (as in Bell and Beare 2002). This process of receiving bids and
distributing entitlements is repeated and a new market price and sales revenue
are determined. An agent’s revenue is maximised when he is unable to locate
an alternative bid strategy that improves his expected net revenue, given a
range of possible bid strategies of other agents. The actual trade outcome is
that which results from the market resolution of the set of agent’s ﬁnal bids.
Entitlement allocation with a trading house
In the operation of the market with a single seller, agents submit to the
trading house bids for entitlements. These bids comprise a desired quantity of
entitlements and a maximum price that the agent is willing to pay for this













Number of market trials k 400
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eﬀectively conducted as a uniform price sealed bid auction.
In seeking to distribute entitlements between agents to maximise overall
sales revenue, the trading house distributes entitlements to highest bidders
ﬁrst, and then the remaining bidders until no entitlements remain. The
market price is the bid price of the last successful bidder. The trading house
then calculates sales revenue as the market price multiplied by the quantity of
entitlements distributed. Agents calculate their net revenue from optimal use
of entitlements in production, taking into account the impact of others on
their own productivity, and use this information to revise their bid to the
market in the following trial in an attempt to increase their net revenue. This
process of receiving bids and distributing entitlements is repeated and a new
market price and sales revenue are determined. In the simulations reported in
this paper, the process was repeated in a series of k random trials. During
these trials, no actual trade takes place. The distribution of entitlements that
results in the highest revenue to the trading house, given the proﬁt
maximising trade strategies of agents, is then taken as the actual trade
outcome. Provided that each agent’s bids strictly increase with their valuation
of entitlements (and all agents are equally riskaverse), the auction outcome
will result in entitlements going to bidders with the highest valuations
(Vickrey 1961; Kagel and Levin 2001).
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